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This paper explores the implications that the construction and use of avatars in games such as 
Second Life and World of Warcraft have for our understanding of personal identity.  It asks 
whether the avatar can meaningfully be experienced as a separate person, existing in parallel to 
the flesh and blood player.  A rehearsal of Cartesian and Lockean accounts of personal identity 
constructs an understanding of the self that is challenged by the experience of online play.  It 
will be argued that playful engagement in virtual worlds invites the participant to reflect upon 
the human being as embodied and social; qualities of which are marginalised by Descartes and 
Locke.  The strangeness of this experience of virtual worlds confronts the player with a 
challenge to construct a coherent narrative of online life, of which treating the avatar as a 
separate person is a coherent option.  This opens up the virtual world as an important space 
within which personal identity is explored, but one with complex implications for our 










The purpose of this paper is to ask in what sense, if any, play within computer games might 
serve to constitute a 'person' who is separate and distinct from any offline personhood.  It will 
be argued that, while play does not necessitate the constitution of a different self or person, 
play does pose a challenge to the player, inviting them to reflect upon the nature of 
personhood, and to construct a coherent narrative that places the often intense, alien and 
emotionally powerful experiences gained through playing in relationship to one's offline, flesh 
and blood, self. 
Of particular concern is the experience of participation within what are known as 'Massively 
Multiplayer Online Games' (MMOG) or 'Worlds' (MMOW).  These are characterised by the 
simultaneous participation of large numbers of players, facilitated through the internet, in a 
virtual environment.   The terms 'game' and 'world' may be used to distinguish those 
environments in which the players are set specific tasks and goals ('games') from those that 
allow players merely to interact and thus to determine their own purposes and pursuits, and 
that typically allow some degree of freedom in building the virtual environment ('worlds').  
MMOGs, having objectives that are constituted through the rules of the game, and may be 
understood as ludic.  MMOWs, in contrast, are more simply playful or paidiaic (Pearce, 2009 
p. 28).  Whether ludic or paidiaic, both encourage rich and complex narrative understandings 
of the virtual environment and one's fellow players in order to participate. The best known of 
MMOGs is perhaps World of Warcraft (WoW), and the best known MMOW may be Second 
Life (SL).i 
It has been long argued in the literature on computer games and virtual reality that MMOGs 
and MMOWs disrupt traditional ideas and experiences of personal identity (see Turkle 1995, 
pp.177-209).  This is due to the fact that one participates in such virtual environments through 
an avatar, which is to say a virtual representation or proxy for the player.  Because the avatar 
need not share the same physical, social or even psychological qualities as those of the player, 
it has been suggested that the avatar, and thus the online or virtual 'self', is a distinct person 
from that of the flesh and blood player at the computer key board. 
The nature of online personhood has been posed largely within a literature framed by 
sociology and ethnography or cultural studies, with little reference to philosophy (see Childs 
2011).  While this has led to the gathering of significant empirical evidence on players' 
psychological and cultural experiences of MMOGs and MMOWs, core concepts in the 
argument, such as 'self', 'person', 'identity', 'personality', and 'character' are frequently left 
vague, and the focus of analysis shifts uneasily.  Thus, a claimed multiplicity of selves may, in 
fact, on the evidence and arguments given, amount more properly to differences between the 
player's inworld and offline personalities.  The purpose of this paper is therefore to offer a 
more disciplined analysis of the appeal to  'personhood' made in attempts to understand the 
experience of virtual play. 
Contemporary accounts of virtual reality, under the significant influence of Turkle (1995), 
tend to appeal to sociological role theory, and under the influence of continental philosophy, 
accept that there is no strict personal identity.  This paper will strive to bridge this use of role 
theory, by linking its most relevant representative, Erving Goffman, back to early modern 
philosophical accounts of personhood (from Descartes (1998) and Locke (1996, pp. 133-149)) 
through the arguments of Mead and Merleau-Ponty.  Descartes and Locke set up a number of 
crucial issues concerning personal identity, and ground much debate within both the 
continental and analytic traditions of philosophy.  Mead, Merleau-Ponty and Goffman, in 
contrast to many analytic theorists, offer resources that are at once sympathetic to 
contemporary video games theory, while allowing a deeper analysis of what is at stake in the 
question of personhood. 
The paper will proceed by offering an introduction to the nature and experience of play 
within virtual worlds before briefly outlining contemporary accounts of selfhood and role-play 
within virtual worlds.  The issue of personal identity will then be explored through Descartes, 
Lockes, Merleau-Ponty and Goffman, in order to suggest that the experiences of play within a 
virtual world may be so anomalous to offline experiences as to require radical solutions for 
their coherent and meaningful interpretation.  Examples of these interpretations will be offered 
in the penultimate section, focusing on the importance of what will be termed 'augmentationist' 




The challenge that virtual reality poses for personal identity or selfhood arises most obviously 
from the nature of the avatar.ii  Depending on the precise rules and programming of the world, 
the player may select an avatar that differs from their flesh and blood body in terms of species 
(e.g. orc, vampire, furry), gender, age and ethnicity.  The avatar may differ in such physical 
attributes as height, weight, muscularity and hair colour.  The avatar may use a wheel chair and 
the flesh and blood player not, or vice versa.  The flesh and blood player may be Jewish, the 
avatar atheist, animist or Muslim.  Perhaps even more radically, in many worlds the avatar may 
be continually tweaked and modified, or the player may cycle between different appearances 
(by changing 'skins' and 'shapes').  The avatar thereby becomes potentially highly fluid, in its 
appearance, allegiances and behavioural traits. 
The peculiarity of the relationship between player and avatar is nicely expressed in Estes' 
account of his SL avatar Enos Andel: 'I first met Enos at a meet-and-greet, which was hectic 
and not conducive to getting to know him.'  Apparently Enos 'didn't look exactly the way I 
imagined he would look – close, yes, but not exactly.  Enos was about medium height, of 
average build with a little bit of extra weight from spending too much time in virtual worlds' 
(2009, p. 77).  Estes experiences Enos as a separate person, to be encountered, not made or 
manipulated.  Estes' description also suggests something of the intensity of emotional 
involvement that participation in a virtual world may involve.  The player is typically drawn 
into complex and demanding emotional relationships, both in terms of the life of the avatar 
itself, and crucially through the avatar's relationships to others (see for example Boellstorff 
(2008, pp. 151-178) on 'intimacy' in SL). 
Turkle, in accounts that continue to ground much theorising of virtual play, suggests that 
the online presence of the avatar allows people to 'build a self by cycling through many selves' 
(1995, p. 178).  The very term 'self' is vague.  Turkle also refers to avatars as 'virtual personae' 
(1995 p. 180; 1999 pp. 643-4), and thus akin to the masks through which Greek actors spoke.  
If this image is fair, then the avatar is no more a different self than an actor's mask or even a 
character played.  It will not displace or subsume the personhood of the flesh and blood 
player..  More subtly, however, Turkle presents the avatar as a parallel exploration of different 
'aspects' of the self (1999 p. 643).  The player uses the avatar as a means for exploring 
aspirations, frustrations and even physiological problems and inhibitions (1995, pp. 186-196).  
Turkle quotes interviewees remarking how different online presences allow them to embody 
different 'moods' or to 'bring out different things in me' (1999 p. 643), or even, through 
different avatars to 'turn different parts of my mind on and off' (1997, p. 74).  Other of Turkle's 
interviewees describe how their behaviour, attitudes, and thus personality differ between the 
different online identities they use (1995, p. 179).  Some feel more themselves online, where 
the avatar is an ideal self (1995 p. 179).  This begins to suggest that there is not a single correct 
understanding of the relationship of the flesh and blood player to the avatar.  Different players 
will understand their avatars, and cope with the emotional intensity of the experience of play, 
differently.  My concern here, then, is to understand the challenge to which these players are 
responding, and thus to assess the coherence and profundity of different responses. 
Turkle herself theorises the avatar through a radical extension of social role theory. Thus, in 
social life, the competent human agent occupies different socially defined roles each day.  As 
Turkle puts this, 'one wakes up as a lover, makes breakfast as a mother, and drives to work as a 
lawyer' (1999, p. 644).  In each role one's behaviour is governed by different rules and norms.  
These will make different demands in terms of one's priorities, motivations, and behavioural 
patterns.  The modern computer radicalises this process, in so far as the computer allows a 
number of windows to be open simultaneously.  Each window may demand the occupation of 
the different social role in order to use it properly.  Here one might consider having one's work 
email, Facebook, and a game open together.  Turkle's point is that prior to the computer, social 
roles were occupied in sequence.  With the computer they are occupied in parallel, by a what 
Turkle calls a 'distributed self' (1999 p. 644).  It is precisely here that the important 
philosophical questions lie.  MMOWs make possible play with the distributed self.  That is to 
say that while participating in an MMOW (or MMOG) one is aware that one is playing a 
game, constituted by its rules.  As such the game is segregated from non-play 'real' life.  Play 
allows experimentation that may be relevant to 'real' virtual experiences (such as the use of 
social networking sites), and crucially, for my current concern, invites the player to reflect 
upon who they are while in the virtual world, and how the avatar-person relates to their flesh 
and blood self. 
 
Role-Playing and the Self 
Relationships between players and their avatars are highly diverse.  While some players will 
indeed see avatars as alternative selves, others will see them as mere playing pieces necessary 
to participation in a game. 
The nature of the game is significant.  In most video games (where the player is simply 
engaging with the computer and not interacting with other human agents), an avatar is 
provided by the game.  It is little more than a tool that facilitates game playing.  Thus 
Bainbridge's note, that in playing SuperMario, his daughters do not identify with an Italian 
plumber (2010 p. 187) is hardly surprising.  It does not undermine the possibility that there is 
something more subtle going on in other forms of game or world.  Perhaps more surprising is 
Geraci's claim that people identify with (or at least have an 'ardent desire to play with') certain 
Monopoly pieces (2014, p 67).  Geraci is attempting to highlight  emotional identification with 
the avatar.  Yet, while I might have an aesthetic or superstitious preference for a shoe over a 
top hat, the role of a playing piece in a game such as Monopoly is fundamentally different to 
that of the avatar is an MMOG.  It was noted above that MMOGs and MMOWs typically 
entail rich narratives.  The Monopoly playing piece is unlikely to have a part in the unfolding 
of such a narrative or the consequent building of characters.  That is to suggest that, while the 
self who plays Monopoly may have emotional attachments to, and even a narrative that makes 
sense of their preference for, a given piece, the piece does not contribute to a narrative that 
unfolds within the particular game of Monopoly.  The piece does not suggest a character or 
persona which the game may be about.  The Monopoly playing piece does not therefore 
encourage me to play or narrate the particular game through a character. 
In Cluedo playing pieces are given human names and titles.  While different pieces, such as 
Miss Scarlet or Professor Green, yield slightly different tactical possibilities, the Cluedo player 
no more identifies with their piece than does Bainbridge with Mario.  While the playing piece 
may now suggest a character, a game of Cluedo makes few narrative demands upon the 
players, and as such does not encourage the player to play through the persona of their playing 
piece.  Ultimately, Cluedo merely presents a logical problem to be solved, and different 
playing pieces do not encourage different styles of play.  A more telling example may be the 
video game Mass Effect.  Here players, for the first time in video gaming, could chose between 
male and female versions of the character (Commander Sheppard) through which the game is 
played.  For a male to play as the female Sheppard, or vice versa, begins to pose the challenge 
of the MMOW avatar.  The avatar can be chosen to be different to the flesh and blood player, 
and playing in that character, crucially constructing and interpreting the narrative of the game 
through (what the player understands to be) female rather than male eyes, may lead to different 
tactics, not least in a game that encourages the player to build a distinctive moral personality as 
they play (see Lavigne 2015).  Thus, the choice of avatar is not merely the choice of an 
aesthetically pleasing playing-piece.  It becomes rather an invitation to construct a narrative as 
one plays the game, and thus to unfold the avatar as a coherent character, with a distinctive 
personality and moral (and indeed tactical) preferences.  A profound and serious response to 
this invitation, through the construction of a coherent character, will mediate the way in which 
the game is played. 
The virtual world radicalises the experience of a game such as Mass Effect.  The avatar that 
represents the player, as noted above, may be bespoke, rather than selected from a limited 
number of options.  More significantly, perhaps, the virtual world invites a certain form of 
role-play.  The nature of role-play is complex and subtle (see Bainbrdige 2010, p. 6), but for 
the purposes of this analysis a contrast may be drawn between role-play and occupation of 
social roles.  In the example of social roles given above (lover, mother, lawyer), each role is 
governed by social rules.  Different societies will facilitate different roles, different role 
combinations (so that, for example, to be able to be both a mother and a lawyer is a historical 
recently achievement), and different ways of performing any given role.  However, for much 
of the time the role will be played as if it is natural.  The competent social agent does not need 
to be conscious of the rules they are following, and indeed is most likely to be aware of them 
only as they are broken or violated.  The social role becomes second nature.  In contrast, it is in 
the nature of a game that players are aware that they are playing it.  Games are constituted by 
their rules, and a player must consciously learn those rules before acquiring any facility in play 
(Suits 2005).iii  While the experienced player may internalise the game's rules, so that rules 
approach the condition of second nature, the rule-book remains a document to which all 
players know that they can and sometimes must refer in order to clarify the legality and 
coherence of play.  The avatar thereby comes to be understood, by the player, as governed by 
the conventional rules of the game.  There is something alienated about the avatar, precisely 
insofar as it is constituted by rules that do not apply offline.  This moment of alienation entails 
that anything experienced through the avatar is potentially disruptive of the player's mundane 
expectations of what counts as meaningful behaviour or action. 
MMOWs, such as SL, further confuse this relationship.  A 'world' invites its participants to 
enter into suspiciously mundane social interaction.  The participant need not occupy explicit 
fantasy roles, or roles structured for the pursuit of ludic goals, the narrative back stories of 
which the player must deliberately learn.  Rather, they occupy social roles that are borrowed 
from or mimic the offline world, such as lover, mother, entrepreneur, or worshipper.  How to 
participate in such roles is already known to the competent social agent.  A world, in contrast 
to a pure game, thus blurs the distinction between that which is explicitly and self-consciously 
conventional, constituted by and for the game, and that which is second nature.  Put otherwise, 
a 'world' at once encourages the participant to forget that they are participating in an 
environment that has been constituted through the designing and invoking of conventional 
rules, and yet as a rule-constituted artificial environment continues to engender disruptive 
experiences.  The vampire, lover and merchant must all alike manage the tension between the 
mundane and the alien. 
This is to suggest that as games acquire the complexity, subtlety and emotional involvement 
of worlds, the challenge to construct the avatar as a coherent character, and to allow that 
character to mediate life within the virtual world, becomes at once more pressing and 
demanding.  In part, this pressure arises from the fact that the player is now interacting, not 
with computer generated opponents, but with other human beings.  The MMOW is a genuinely 
social and intersubjective environment.  This environment, again to emphasis a point already 
made, may be intensely emotionally affecting (see Blascovich & Bailenson 2011), and actions 
may have serious moral consequences, for they impact upon other humans.  It is this playful 
environment, I am proposing, that invites reflection upon the nature of the self, as an 
embodied, interactive being. 
 
Personal identity (Descartes and Locke) 
The player will not necessarily brings to the virtual world a developed theory of the self, 
although the profiles that SL invites the player to make available to other residents does ask for 
both inworld and 'real world' biographies, thus already allowing the narrative of the two 
'selves' to be distinguished.  The issue of the player's relationship to their avatar is one upon 
which players reflect, and with which they often struggle.  In this section, I will outline the 
account of personal identity proposed in early-modern philosophy as a proxy of a starting point 
for lay understandings of the self, before linking this to a more philosophically penetrating 
account, and one that embraces role theory, in the following sections. 
Descartes and Locke provide two key articulations of the problem of personal identity.  
While Descartes articulates a sophisticated metaphysical defence of what might be regarded as 
the common sense assumption that the identity of the person is something strict, unitary and 
inviolable, Locke begins to open the possibility that personhood is a construct and potentially 
plural.  It may be suggested that Descartes' metaphysics responds to an intuition that human 
beings ought to have a single identity over their lifetimes. Locke responds more to the 
conscious experience of that identity, not least in memory.  Experiences that disrupt the 
Cartesian intuition, and virtual reality is one of these experiences, are unsettling and invite a 
response. 
Descartes' indubitable maxim, 'I think therefore I am' (1998, p. 18), lies at the core of his 
account of personal identity.  The 'I' knows that it exists because it thinks.  Even to doubt its 
own existence entails an act of thought, and thus the very existence of the thinker that is 
supposedly being brought into question.  Descartes posits a thinking substance (as distinct 
from the extended, physical substance that constitutes the material world and the human body) 
that guarantees the existence and identity of the person.  This substance exists independently of 
the body and is unchanging during and beyond the body's mortal existence.  The person is 
therefore the single, unified and unchanging substance, within which all psychological 
experience inheres.  While Descartes is well aware that changes to the physical body (such as 
ageing, illness and drunkenness) do impact upon a human's psychological states, and thus 
moods and attitudes, they do not change the identity of the person.  The experience of playing 
an avatar online will not thus impact upon identity, and nor will it be a separate identity, for the 
experience of play necessarily inheres in the thinking substance of the flesh and blood player. 
Locke's empiricist response to Descartes throws into question the coherence of the idea of a 
soul substance, not least because it is not something that can be experienced independently of 
the accidental properties, which is to say psychological events such as thoughts, emotions and 
memories, that inhere in it.iv  Identity for Locke is thus something that must be experienced as 
such, and crucially through the continuity of memory (1996, Bk II, section xxvii, 10).  He 
suggests that neither reincarnation nor the transmigration of souls are incompatible with 
Cartesian metaphysics, but that if so there are ambiguities in the Cartesian account.  If a soul 
substance were to be reincarnated, but upon reincarnation lose all memory of its previous life, 
it would, for Descartes, still be the same person, albeit in a possibly very different body and 
with a different psychology (just as the online person and the avatar are the same, regardless of 
differences in body and psychology).v  Similarly, the soul substance could migrate between 
bodies (and Locke offers the story of the prince and the pauper).  Here the soul retains its 
memory of life in the old body.  While Locke is sceptical of any justification regarding a 
reincarnated soul having retained the identity of the person, he accepts, precisely because of 
the continuity of memory, that the transmigrated soul could retain that identity.  Thus, Locke 
separates bodily identity from the psychologically grounded identity of the person, as does 
Descartes, but only on the ground that psychological continuity is empirically experienced 
(rather than being a metaphysical postulate).  Indeed, it may be suggested that one has, for 
Locke, to constitute one's identity through an act of recall.  The self, as a unified and singular 
entity is constructed by drawing together the existing strands of memory.  The Lockean self 
thus opens the way to thinking of personhood as something constructed through narrative.  Put 
otherwise, the intuition that personal identity ought to be strict entails that anomalous 
experiences pose the challenge of constructing a coherent and meaningful narrative that 
accounts for the anomaly.  The self thereby comes to exist as the narrative coherence of 
remembered events (see Ricoeur 1991). 
More radically, this opens Locke to the possibility that the personal identity of a human 
being is fragmentary during their lifetime.  Again, put otherwise, it may not be possible to 
construct a single unified narrative from known events.  Amnesia, for example, seemingly cuts 
the thread of identity.  Thus, if when drunk a human commits crimes that they do not 
remember when sober, they are not, for Locke, strictly responsible for those acts, or at least 
should not be punished, for the punishment must be felt by the person who remembers 
committing the crime, and that person ceased to exist with the onset of sobriety (1996, Bk II, 
section xxvii, 6 & 20).  Thus, while Cartesian personal identity is impervious to the effects that 
alcohol might have, not merely on memory, but also upon psychology (and thus an agent's 
intentions, moods and motivations), the Lockean person is potentially fragmented by it.  The 
human drunk is a different person to the human sober.  The activities of the drunk cannot be 
absorbed into the narrative of the sober person.  This begins to hint at a sense in which the 
avatar online might be a different person to the offline player, for the avatar's experience, 
behaviour and motivations may be so anomalous as to not easily find a place in the narrative of 
the flesh and blood player   However, Locke demands a clear rupture of memory.  Merely 
logging into a computer program does not erase the player's offline memories (and nor does 
logging out erase memory of the online world).  A certain narrative ingenuity should facilitate 
integration of the avatar's activities into the personal narrative of the flesh and blood player.  
As such, early modern accounts of personal identity seem to leave little plausibility in the 
claims of contemporary theorists that the 'distributed self' is in any way genuinely constitutive 
of plural identities. 
 
Personal Identity (Merleau-Ponty) 
There are two fundamental weaknesses in Descartes' and Locke's account of the person, and 
addressing these will serve to open up the possibility that the avatar may, legitimately, be 
experienced as a different person to the player.  Firstly, neither account of personal identity 
recognises the importance of embodiment.  Secondly, neither recognises that humans are social 
beings, necessarily interacting with others.  The implications of these criticisms for 
understanding personhood in virtual reality may be explored in turn. 
For both Descartes and Locke the body is something fundamentally separate from the 
mind..  The body is something the person has.  For Locke it is, indeed, the logically most 
primitive form of property.  This dualism is challenged by Merleau-Ponty (2005).  A 
distinction may be made  between 'having a body' and 'being a body'.  To treat the body as a 
possession is to objectify it.  It is a tool through which one interacts with the physical world.  
This objectification may be legitimate, for example when the body is injured and thus inhibits 
everyday movement and activity.  However, for Merleau-Ponty, one is primarily one's body.  
The body is not experienced as another object in the world, but is rather the medium through 
which other objects are experienced.  The body mediates the way in which one perceives the 
world, and not, as Locke and Descartes might themselves acknowledge, simply because of the 
limitations or quirks of eye sight, hearing and touch.  It is rather that the physical capability of 
the body will shape how objects are understood as part of a meaningful world.  For a strong 
and well co-ordinated ten year old a tree might be an object of adventure, to be climbed.  To 
the less agile but more technically skilled adult, it may be a source of timber.  The tree is never 
simply a physical object, but always a meaningful structure of possibilities.  This structure 
emerges from the co-ordination of the body with the world around it.  The body and world thus 
function as an integrated and meaningful whole, and do so because the body frames the 
meaning the agent can ascribe to the world. 
As explored above, MMOGs and MMOWs offer a virtual embodiment that can be different 
to that of the player's flesh and blood experience.  The paralytic can walk; the heavy person 
become slender; and the uncoordinated become fluent and elegant in their movements.  As 
such, the virtual body may not be something that the player has, as a mere playing-piece 
through which they interact with the game.  Rather, it is that through which they experience the 
virtual world.  The body is the transcendental condition of possibility of a meaningful world, 
and a world that is full of opportunities that are denied to the flesh and blood person.vi 
As this argument stands, it does not yet offer enough to suggest the possibility of the avatar 
as a separate self.  It may be constitutive of action within the alien virtual world, but that world 
is still, ultimately, experienced through the flesh and blood body of the player.  Turning to the 
social interactionism and role-theory that informs contemporary work of MMOWs may offer a 
more radical account of human selfhood that opens the possibility of the avatar being 
interpreted as a distinct self. 
 
Personal Identity (Mead and Goffman) 
The second criticism of Cartesian and Lockean accounts of personal identity is that they are 
asocial.  This criticism has two related aspects.  Firstly, they fail to recognise that the human 
agent comes to conscious always already within society, interacting with other human beings.  
Secondly, both Descartes and Locke treat personal identity exclusively from within, which is 
to say, as a first person psychological experience (of thinking or remembering).  As a social 
being the person is also judged to be such from without.  Others identify the object before them 
as an embodied person, and re-identify that body as the same person they encountered 
previously. 
The tradition of symbolic interactionism offers a response to Descartes' and Locke's 
failings.  The fundamental claim here is that only through alter's recognition of ego as a person 
will ego's identity coalesce sufficiently for it to achieve self-consciousness.  This is to argue 
that consciousness of oneself as a person is not a given, as Descartes assumes, but rather an 
achievement, the possibility of which presupposes access to appropriate social resources in 
order to be realised appropriately.  Thus, Mead argues that one's self-consciousness develops 
only as one comes to see oneself as others see you (1934, p. 135).  What Mead describes as the 
'me', which is to say the self as an object of conscious reflection, is necessarily a social self.  
Self-consciousness presupposes that one internalises the judgemental gaze of the other.  In so 
doing, one internalises not merely an individual's perception, but rather the social structure of 
which that individual is a part.  The other is an occupant of a social role, and thus one 
internalises the relevant structure of social roles.  This suggests, akin to Merleau-Ponty's 
arguments concerning embodiment, that different social structures will lead to differently 
structured selves, and thus, potentially, different persons. 
Mead is not arguing for social determinism.  While he rejects the simple, existentialist or 
libertarian, autonomy that can be found in Locke, he argues that the agent, or 'I', will still 
actively and creatively respond to the 'me' (1934, p. 175).  The 'I' has a degree of freedom to 
interpret the social situation (or world) in which it finds itself.  There is therefore a space, in 
Mead's model, for human autonomy (albeit a freedom that is at once made possible and 
constrained by the social embeddedness of the agent), and the possibility that the 'I' has an on-
going identity that the 'me' lacks.  As such, the Cartesian might readily argue that it is the 'I' 
that is the true source of personal identity, and not the fragmentary 'me'.  Yet the 'I' is known 
only retrospectively.  It cannot be captured in the moment of its action, but only as its actions 
and choices are recalled.  The 'I', considered independently of any concrete world, is thus a 
mere abstraction, lacking substance.  Again, this suggests that the self as 'I' may have a 
Cartesian metaphysical status.  Yet it escapes experience and thus stands, in effect, as little 
more than an expression of the intuitive aspiration to strict personal identity .  To be known 
and thus to be a substantial agent presupposes, as Locke argues, construction in memory.  
Substantial agency  is necessarily the narratively constructed 'me'. 
Mead's analysis already hints at a challenge: to bring the fragmentary experience of the 'me' 
together into a unified and coherent narrative, and thus respond to the intuitive desire for the 
identity of the 'I'..   It is precisely this challenge, it is being argued, that play in virtual reality 
poses.  Mead's work on play, and specifically role-play (1934, pp. 152ff) is significant here.  
He presents role-play as a mechanism through which the emerging self learns to internalise the 
perceptions of others.  Mead's point is that, in role-play, one learns not simply one's own role, 
but crucially the roles of others, and the structural relationships that they have to one's own. In 
entering an MMOG, as an already well-formed and competent social agent, one is not learning, 
but rather playing with the process of becoming self-conscious.  The conventionality of the 
rules of the game entail that MMOG is, in part at least, a play with personal identity.  The very 
fragmentariness, flux and strangeness of the avatar and virtual world pose a playful problem 
for narrative construction.  As such, it may be suggested, in constructing an avatar and entering 
into social interactions with other avatars, the player is being invited to constitute a 'person' 
that, in order to take account of the alien nature of its embodied and social experience, my be 
distinct from the one that has been constituted in the offline world. 
This argument may be developed through reference to Erving Goffman.  Goffman offers an 
elegant development of the Meadian position, and one that has a significant influence on the 
study of virtual reality (see Bainbridge 2010, p. 174).  While Mead's account of the 
internalisation of social roles suggests a somewhat passive and automatic process, Goffman 
stresses the active engagement of the competent human agent in shaping, and thus presenting, 
themselves to the gaze of others.  Within a given social situation, the agent modifies their 
behaviour, forms of communication, appearance and demeanour.  Thus, in the dining room, in 
Goffman's classic example (1956, pp. 72-4), the waiter is elegant and polite; in the kitchen, 
they relax, joke with the cook, allow their appearance and posture to slip.  Goffman's point is 
not that agents cynically manipulate their appearance and behaviour to their own advantage 
(although the con-artist can indeed do this).  Rather, the agent is facilitating the smooth 
functioning of the social situation.  An elegant waiter enhances the diners' experience as well 
as securing a better tip.  Further, the simple manipulation of others is limited by the fact that 
this presentation will be interpreted and evaluated, freely and perhaps unpredictably, by the 
others one encounters.  The meaning and worth of the presentation, and thus exactly the sort of 
person one is, becomes a matter of negotiation and social construction.  Crucially, as Mead 
suggested with the internalisation of the perception of the other, personhood is known not 
simply from within, but judged and interpreted by third parties. 
Virtual worlds such as SL play, thematically, with this process of presentation.  As has been 
noted above, the appearance of the avatar can be manipulated and modified in fine detail.  In 
addition the avatar can be given poses, gestures and movements that enhance the presentation.  
Textual statements can also be made available to others that allow further description, 
expression or qualification of the avatar's self-image.  On one level, the avatar then becomes 
the body through which one experiences the virtual world.  But, to go beyond the account 
derived from Merleau-Ponty above, this is not simply a physical body.  It is rather a social 
body, that will be interpreted and evaluated by those who encounter it.  The avatar thus 
constitutes a virtual world, and acts in it, through the internalisation and negotiation of the gaze 
of the other.  The self and world are thus reciprocally constituted intersubjectively and 
imaginatively. 
The question remains as to whether Goffmanian selves are genuinely different persons, or 
merely expressions of a single person.  Two interpretations may be offered of Goffman.  In 
one, which is probably Goffman's self-interpretation, he retains the person as a 'ghostly “I”' 
standing outside society' (MacIntyre 2007, p. 32).  This reinforces the idea of the agent as a 
cynical manipulator of their appearance.  The true agent is that which selects appropriate 
personae.  It is, in effect, still the abstract Meadian 'I'.  On such an account, the avatar is, as 
Turkle suggests, merely an persona, and the 'real' person exists in flesh and blood, in the 
offline world. 
Yet this interpretation can be challenged.  The Meadian 'I' is, it has been argued above, in its 
very abstraction, impotent.  At best it is the condition of possibility of action, but is not itself 
active.  From Merleau-Ponty it may be argued that the substantial condition of  agency lies in 
the concrete body.  Taking this argument further, it may be suggested that the human agent 
only becomes capable of real choice and autonomy when both embodied and situated within a 
world.  That is to say that agency is facilitated by the availability of the concrete cultural 
resources made available to it in the world.vii  The world, experienced through the body, offers 
the resources necessary to make choices. The virtually embodied player is thus not merely 
confronted by a new set of possibilities from which she or he can choose.  Rather, the very 
parameters and possibilities of choice are reconstituted by the experience of the virtual world.   
By returning to the discussion of Merlau-Ponty above.  There it was argued that freedom in 
enabled by the concrete embedding of the agent in the world. 
While Merleau-Ponty's agency focuses on the body, following Mead and Goffman a richer 
notion of embeddedness may be suggested.  This is to argue that the agent is enabled 
constituted in its freedom by drawing on, not merely on embodied perception, but also upon a 
socially interpreted and negotiated world.  The point is, then, that Gofofman's agent does not 
make a decision about the presentation of self from a 'nowhere' outside society.  Rather, the 
decision is made within the concrete social world.  There is no agency, and thus no 
personhood, outside the concrete embeddedness in society.  There is no abstract 'I' or Cartesian 
ego.  Rather, the person, characterised in terms of a specific normative interpretation and thus 
constitution of its world, and thus as a being that has distinctively interpreted experiences, 
motivations and behavioural responses, is constituted through embodied social interaction 
within a particular world.  Recalling the conventional and often alien nature of the rules that 
constitute the virtual world (and that it may be presumed, following Mead on play, are 
internalised into the roles that avatars play), it may be argued that the virtual body of the avatar 
and MMOW that it inhabits and within which it has its agency are constitutive of a world that 
is so radically different from any experienced by the flesh and blood player, that it becomes 
possible, and at times necessary, to understand the agency that is manifest in the avatar as a 
separate person (and as such as constituted in its own unique narrative). 
This analysis remains vulnerable to Lockean accounts of memory.  The flesh and blood 
player can, when they stop playing, still remember online experiences, and even while playing, 
however absorbing that play might be, still recall offline experiences.  The radical break in 
memory required by the Lockean account of multiple persons seems not to be available  It may 
nonetheless be argued that As argued above, while shifting between worlds may not, as Locke 
would want,  severe the thread of memory, it does serve radically to transform the quality of 
memory.  Is transformed.  On such an account, it is plausible to suggest that the radical 
strangeness of the virtual world does encourage an understanding of the avatar as a separate 
person.  It is being suggested that, once embedded in the virtual world – and so becoming 
rather than merely having an avatar – agency may change so fundamentally that choices that 
would have been incomprehensible offline become natural and desirable online.  While online, 
the offline memory may then be recalled and perceived, but only through the lens of the 
current online embodiment.  As such it is qualitatively changed.  Thus, for example, after a 
rewarding experience questing in WoW, the remembered achievements of an offline life may 
seem boring and hollow, not something to which one would want to return readily.  Equally, 
after experiencing the rich rewards of offline work and achievement, the online quest may 
appear shallow and a waste of time.  Put otherwise, the narratives of offline and online life will 
diverge, potentially to the point of inconsistency.  This begins to suggest that it is legitimate to 
assert that two persons, rather than merely two personalities, exist. 
In summary, virtual worlds offer the possibility of the constitution of a parallel and separate 
person, if personhood is understood as substantial agency.  Cartesian identity is abstract.  It is a 
mere possibility of personhood until realised substantially through embodiment in a social 
world.  This possibility is constructed as a concrete person, retrospectively and out of 
remembered details, in a broadly coherent narrative construct.  The coherence and 
meaningfulness of this narrative will depend, in significant part, upon the rules that govern the 
social roles and worlds.  Such rules give meaning to social actions.  Personal identity begins to 
fragment as the rules that govern diverse roles and worlds diverge to the point of 
incommensurability.  It is thus being suggested, not simply that the avatar is a separate person, 
and that Turkle's 'distributed self' is necessarily understood as a multiplicity of persons. Rather, 
it is being suggested that the virtual world poses a The challenge.  T posed by the virtual 
world, thanks to the fluidity and alienation of the avatar is such that the player is confronted 
with anomalous experiences that require incorporation into a coherent narrative of personhood.  
Some experiences may be so anomalous that a plurality of narratives, and thus the experience 
of multiple selves, offers the most meaningful and coherent option., lies in constructing a 
coherent narrative of a person consistent with (and indeed meaningful to) any offline sense of 
self. 
 
Interpretations of virtual experience. 
Accounts of players' diverse understandings of their relationship to their avatars may be 
understood as responses to the challenge posed by virtual play.  Geraci, with reference to the 
ludic WoW, proposes four different relationships: (1) character as extension of the self; (2) 
multiple characters reflecting different aspects of the self; (3) a combination of these first two; 
(4) the character as nothing but as toy or puppet for playing the game (2014, p. 67).  Crucially, 
he notes that at least half of the players to whom he spoke adopted the fourth option.  Perhaps 
more significantly, with reference to the paidiaic SL, Geraci highlights the difference between 
those players who treat their avatar as an augmentation of their offline selves (and thus, as 
Turkle privileges, expressing or exploring different 'aspects' of a complex offline personality), 
and those 'immersionists' who treat the avatar as a personality that is wholly distinct from the 
offline self of the player (2014, pp. 112-3).  One immersionist notes how her avatar 'woke up, 
emerged as a personality, and kicker [her] creator out' (Geraci 2014, p. 113).  It may still be 
noted that, in this quote, the avatar emerges, not as a person or self, but as a 'personality'.  The 
shifts and ambiguities between key terms continue. 
The complexity of players' relationships to their avatars may be clarified by considering an 
extreme example.  Ethnographer Tom Boellstorff created a SL avatar, Tom Bukowski, that 
mimicked his offline self in order to study the virtual world (Boellstorff 2008).  Confined by 
research ethics, if nothing else, in SL he occupies the social role of the ethnographer, and thus 
akin to the role that Boellstorff occupied in his earlier field work in Indonesia.  Here the player 
is at pains to make the avatar as transparent as possible to his offline professional purposes and 
preoccupations, given the limits of the representational medium that is SL. 
Against Boellstorff's 'mimetic-player' may be placed the 'role-player'.  Rather than 
considering the avatar as a simple representation of oneself in the game medium, the avatar 
may be more or less radically separated from one's flesh and blood self.  If an MMOG invites 
the player to adopt a role in order to play the game, then that role, manifest through the avatar, 
may be considered little more than a playing piece or puppet.  One need have no emotional 
connection to the avatar.  It need not facilitate even the exploration of the different 'aspects' of 
oneself to which Turkle refers.  There may still be narrative challenges here, for the player may 
take an aesthetic pride in playing the character well, coherently and imaginatively (and as such 
construct a coherent narrative for that character).  Such thoughtful and committed play may 
indeed enhance the experience the game, but the player would still not need, in any way, to 
understand the avatar as a real person, merely as a fictional character. 
MMOWs, such as SL, confuse this relationship between mimesis and role-play, and as such 
place more complex narrative demands upon the player.  This may be illustrated and more 
profoundly analysed by returning to augmentationists and immersionists.  Both may be 
understood as role-players.  Immersionists are simply more intense in their role-play.  Very 
tellingly, Geraci suggests that the distinction lies in the 'metaphysical commitments' of the 
players.  Augumentationists see SL as an extension of their offline selves, while immersionists 
recognise a radical ontological break between online and offline (2014, p. 111).  As such, both 
are recognising and responding to virtual reality as an ontological challenge.  Geraci then 
suggests that immersionists may be shallow or deep.  The difference, he argues, is that shallow 
immersionists know that they are 'playing with identity in SL' (p. 111).  Shallow immersion is 
self-conscious role-playing, while deep immersion is not.  However, this distinction is not 
wholly satisfactory for it muddles the relationship between an augmentationist and a shallow 
immersionist.  Further, it is not clear in what sense deep immersionists are not aware of role-
playing. 
If the earlier analyses of role-play and the constitute nature of rules in games are plausible, 
then the key distinction is between augmentationists, who are self-conscious role-players – 
albeit that they see their roles as being linked to and playing with aspects of their offline 
personality – and the more daring immersionists – who construct the pretence of total 
absorption in the avatar, not as a conventional construct, but as a discovered and natural being, 
that has its own coherence and integrity.  Put otherwise, the deep immersionist asserts that any 
question as to the relationship between the avatar and the flesh and blood player is grounded in 
a category mistake.  The very question misunderstands the nature of the avatar (which is 
ontologically something radically distinct from any flesh and blood operator).viii  On such an 
interpretation deep immersion is not unconscious, but rather a conscious and imaginative 
engagement with the question of the nature of personhood.  Augmentationists and 
immersionists are alike (valid) responses to the narrative challenge posed by virtual play. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
In his commentary on Goffman, MacIntyre takes his account of the presentation of the self to 
be symptomatic of the fragmenting affect that modern society, with its requirement that agents 
disperse themselves between discrete social roles.  For MacIntyre, the fragmentation of the self 
is a problem, and it is a problem that invites the solution of finding appropriate ways to 
reconstruct a unified narrative of the self (2007, p. 34).  It has been claimed above that the 
experience of virtual reality poses an ontological challenge in so far as it invites reflection, in 
the form of the construction of coherent narratives of the self, on the nature of personhood. 
This challenge may be understood in MacIntyrean terms.  In entering a virtual world, and 
becoming embodied as an avatar, one begins to play with social roles and the processes 
through which self-consciousness is constructed in contemporary society.  The fluidity of the 
avatar and the strangeness of the virtual world offer a potentially radical experience of 
fragmentation.  Players, it has been suggested, respond to this experience in different ways, 
offering different narratives. 
The mimetic player treats the virtual world as the possibility for the projection of an offline 
social role.  The discontinuity between the virtual and non-virtual is discounted.  In effect, the 
ontological challenge is ignored.  There is no special difficulty in narrating virtual experiences, 
for they will be coherent with offline experience. 
The role-player adopts something akin to the cynical interpretation of Goffman.  The avatar 
is a mere, self-consciously adopted, persona.  It is a tool for playing the game.  Perhaps more 
subtly, the virtual world is itself experienced as an object within the offline world, and not as a 
world in its own right.  The role-player never leaves the offline world, and thus ultimately it is 
their flesh and blood embodiment that determines the way in which they experience the game.  
Again, the narrative of virtual experience is easily accommodated within the narrative of the 
flesh and blood self, and at most requires the caveat that this is play, and as such a hiatus from 
the pressures of everyday life. 
The augmentationist recognises the separateness of the virtual world, but in treating the 
avatar as an extension or exploration of the offline self, continues to oscillate between the two 
worlds.  Here the ontological challenge is more acute.  The avatar within the virtual world will 
have an autonomy of its own.  Its behaviour, its attitudes and perceptions may significantly 
diverge from those of the flesh and blood player.  Traditional narrative structures that assume a 
unified, if developing, character at their heart, may thus become strained and awkward. 
Augmentationists typically struggle to find a grammar that can articulate this complex, uneasy 
experience. 
The immersionist offers the most radical solution.  The virtual world is sundered from the 
flesh and blood world, and the narrative of online experience need have nothing to do with 
flesh and blood experience.  Cartesian identity is abandoned.  Yet, unlike the augmentationist, 
this solution may be too radical.  It too readily assumes that the online person can forget the 
offline, or that online experiences might affect the offline (and vice versa).  In effect, it ignores 
its own consciousness of the division between online and offline, and pretends that, in the 
virtual world, it is not playing. 
Virtual worlds allow play with personal identity.  But the presentation of self in virtual 
media, such as Facebook, LinkedIn or Twitter, are increasingly important in contemporary 
society.  The virtual world is thus also a play with the more serious work done in other social 
media.  As such, the four approaches towards the challenge of the self, just rehearsed from the 
first person perspective, also have important moral implications for how one perceives others 
within virtual reality. 
One may perceive the avatar of the other, their presentation of self within virtual reality, as 
mimetic.  That is to say, one could naively assume that the person encountered online is 
continuous with the person offline.  The dangers of such naivety, especially when they lead to 
unguarded encounters with the flesh and blood player, are evident.  To treat others a mere role-
players (and thus potentially con-artists) is more cautious, but risks surrendering the emotional 
intensity that encounters within virtual worlds can yield.  To treat others as augmentationists is 
perhaps the obvious approach towards most social media sites.  On such sites, the flesh and 
blood self is presented to its best advantages, as photographs are Photoshopped, Cvs tweaked 
and one's achievements flagged and failures glossed over.  Yet, the complexity of 
augmentation reasserts itself. Without contact with the flesh and blood player, exactly what has 
been augmented, and what that augmentation might mean, cannot be known.  The flesh and 
blood player remains an enigma.  In any intense, emotionally involving encounter within 
virtual reality, the person encountered is thus, by default, an immersionist.  The person 
encountered exists only within the virtual world.  Assumptions about the flesh and blood 
player are mere speculation.  An ethics that at once safeguards the players, and yet allows 
intense involvement, presupposes that everyone is an immersionist.  It is thus here, in one's 
online relationships to others, that the separateness of the personhood of the avatar has its 
ultimate purchase.  The avatar, morally and prudentially, should be treated as a person that is 
radically distinct to any flesh and blood player.  It is a person that only exists inworld, and 
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i
   World of Warcraft is a registered trademark of Blizzard Entertainment, Inc.  Second Life 
is a registered trade mark of Linden Research, Inc.  
 
ii
   It may be noted that the concept of the 'avatar' may embrace any online representation, 
so will include the visual and textual presentations of self found on social web sites such as 
Facebook, LinkedIn and ResearchGate. 
 
iii
   Suits does not fully recognise the significance of the need for players to be conscious of 
the conventionality of play.  See Edgar's criticism of Suits' interpretation of the thought 
experiment of the 'dedicated driver' as an articulation of this point (Edgar 2014 pp. 34-8). 
 
iv
   Hume's bundle theory the self takes this argument to its logical conclusion.  The self, at 
least as soul substance, does not exist, for it is not experienced.  All that one experiences of 
one's self is a  continually changing flux of mental events (1985, pp. 299-310). 
 
v
   The implications of Locke's arguments are developed most radically, in the analytic 
tradition, by Parfit (1986). 
 
vi
   Blascovich and Bailenson (2011) explore in depth the way in which the experience of 
online bodies, both superior and inferior to one's flesh and blood body, may change at least 
the personality of the player. 
 
vii
     Sandel (1982) makes a similar criticism o of Rawls' (broadly Lockean) conception of 
the liberal self. 
 f Rawls (broadly Lockean) conception of the liberal self. 
viii
   http://sophrosyne-sl.livejournal.com/50673.htmlThe deeply immersed avatar 
Sophrosyne Stenvaag also has Flikr and Twitter accounts, and thus an extensive online 
presence.  See https://www.flickr.com/photos/8325800@N07/ [all accessed 11th November 
2015] 
 
